As such cases suggest, it is facially plausible but implausible upon reflection to construe the self-defense privilege as encoding a principled moral commitment to predicating the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff on whether he treated her wrongfully. In such cases, a relational understanding of the privilege’s moral logic would implausibly divorce this logic from common moral intuition. The more plausible view is that relational wrongdoing between defendant and plaintiff, in mistaken self-defense cases, is not the ground of the former’s liability to the latter even if it mostly tracks this ground well enough. Like the apparent consent privilege, the self-defense privilege’s moral function is not to identify and redress a relational moral wrong between defendant and plaintiff; it is to roughly track features of the defendant’s conduct (in particular, his culpability) and the plaintiff’s conduct (in particular, her responsibility for inducing a relevant mistake about whether she has consented or is aggressing) that help to determine whether the former is liable to the latter.
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